





Addiction is not a natural kind
 
I argue that addiction is not an appropriate category to support generalizations for the  
purposes of scientific prediction.That is, addiction is not a natural kind. I discuss the Home-  
ostatic Property Cluster (HPC) theory of kinds, according to which members of a kind share  
a cluster of properties generated by a common mechanism or set of mechanisms. Leading  
accounts of addiction in literature fail to offer a mechanism that explains addiction across  
substances. I discuss popular variants of the disease conception and demonstrate that  
at least one class of substances that fails to confirm a major prediction of each account.  
When no mechanism can be found to explain the occurrence of the relevant properties in  
members of a category, the HPC view suggests that we revise our categories. I discuss  
options offered by the HPC view, including category revision and category replacement. I  
then conclude that talk of addiction as a prediction-supporting category should be replaced  
with categories such as “S-addiction” and “T-addiction,” where S and T are substances or  
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INTRODUCTION: ADDICTION AND GENERALIZATIONS
Addiction is discussed as a unified class or condition in philo-
sophical and scientific literature (1). That is, addiction is treated
as a category under which substantive generalizations can be sub-
sumed. Basic scientists are concerned with generalizations for the
purposes of prediction, clinical scientists for the purpose of diag-
nosis and treatment of symptoms – ideally on the basis of the
knowledge generated by basic science – and philosophers are inter-
ested in attributions of responsibility to individuals and to which
categories of individuals those attributions apply, as responsibility
is an essential component of autonomy1. While this tendency to
subsume generalizations under the category addiction is prevalent
in many fields, it is especially explicit in the dominant paradigm
in cognitive neuroscience, the disease paradigm [e.g., Ref. (2, 3)].
But are we justified in making these generalizations? In this
discussion, I shall argue that we are not. We ought not treat all
cases of addiction as a unified category for scientific, clinical, or
philosophical purposes.
GENERALIZATIONS AND KIND TERMS
Categories in the sciences that support generalizations are referred
to as natural kinds. To a first approximation, members of a kind
share properties in virtue of something that makes them mem-
bers of this category2. Members of a kind share these properties
1While there are many practical uses of defining addiction, including legal and per-
sonal reasons (19), I focus on the three mentioned above as I understand them to be
intimately related: clinical diagnosis and treatment for mental disorders depends on
the underlying neurocognitive structure of the patient. And while the relationship
between what psychology tells us about the mind/brain and how we attribute moral
status such as moral responsibility is doubtless a complex issue, rather, I am simply
saying that realist moral psychology requires that the attribution of moral properties
be in some way influenced by how the mind actually works.
2These features are often referred to as essences, though I will avoid this term as it is
loaded in implying something metaphysically special, i.e., Aristotelian essences (12),
non-accidentally. If the kind is a natural kind, they share these
properties in virtue of some scientific basis, be it a shared atomic
structure in the physical sciences, or according to the Homeostatic
Property Cluster (HPC) view of natural kinds, shared mechanisms
in the life sciences.
Many have argued, both in philosophy [e.g., Ref. (4, 5)] and
neuroscience [e.g., Ref. (6)] that addiction is a syndrome that
varies greatly between individuals on a case by case basis. I agree
that there is at least this level of variance, but such variance does
not undermine the hypothesis that addiction is a natural kind.
As I’ll discuss, categories or kind terms in the life sciences
such as biology and psychology contain a high degree of inher-
ent variation across members, and this variation is not a problem
for their ability to count as generalization-subsuming categories.
However, this variance among individual members of a kind is
unproblematic only insofar as those members share whatever
properties they do in virtue of a common mechanism or set of
mechanisms.
The dominant paradigm contends that addiction constitutes a
natural kind as different expressions of a single disease, hence the
term (hereafter used) disease paradigm. The name suggests that
the underlying mechanisms are bio/psychological in nature, thus,
according to the disease paradigm, addiction is putatively a natural
kind3.
My argument is that addiction is not a natural kind because
the properties shared by addicted individuals are not explained
in virtue of underlying shared mechanisms across substances of
addiction.
and I wish to avoid such confusion. However, essences need not be metaphysically
special.
3There are two kinds of kinds, so to speak: natural and social. Very roughly, mem-
bers of natural kinds share properties in virtue of something natural or physical and
members of social kinds share their properties in virtue of something social (11).

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
Because kind term claims are warranted by the existence (or
lack thereof) of mechanisms, they are dependent on current sci-
ence. Thus, my argument more specifically is that the disease
conception, as the dominant paradigm in current cognitive neu-
roscience, fails to provide evidence – and indeed provides discon-
firming evidence – that the mechanisms of addiction apply across
addictive substances.
Rather, the best suited natural kind terms to explain what
we refer to as “addiction” are several subcategories, which, for
lack of a better vocabulary, I will distinguish as “S-addiction”
“T-addiction,” etc., where S and T stand in for either particular
addicting substances or sets of substances.
The argument proceeds as follows. In S 2, I sketch the popular
HPC theory of kinds, and in S 3 I suggest how HPC kinds might
map onto addiction.
Then, in S 4, I discuss how various models of addiction fail
to identify a unified set of mechanisms that explain all cases. I
review three mechanistic proposals popular within the disease
paradigm. First, I discuss the aberrant learning hypothesis (7),
which proposes that habitual behaviors out of the control of con-
scious/executive systems, realized in dopaminergic projections to
and in the dorsal striatum is hypothesized to underlie drug-related
behaviors. However, I present evidence that addiction to cannabis
does not seem to involve such dopamine activity in the dorsal
striatum. Second, I discuss the incentive sensitization hypothe-
sis (8), which proposes that neuroadaptations to the mesolimbic
dopamine system cause addicted individuals to consistently over-
value the extent to which they “want” drugs at the expense of other
stimuli, including non-drug rewards. However, evidence suggests
cannabis addiction seems to involve an increase in the“wanting”of
non-drug rewards. Finally, I discuss the frontostriatal dysfunction
model [e.g., Ref. (9, 10)]. On this view, multiple circuits realized
at least in part in prefrontal cortical areas underlie various aspects
of executive control and are inhibited in addiction. However, there
is evidence that the neuroadaptations to certain prefrontal areas,
including the medial PFC generally but especially the ventrome-
dial and dorsomedial areas, differ between instances of addiction
to cocaine and stimulants versus addiction to opiates.
In S 5 I discuss what categories might best explain the phe-
nomena of addiction, and in S 6 I consider the scientific and
philosophical implications of the disunity of addiction.
TERMINOLOGY AND STRATEGY
Before offering an account of natural kinds as well as one of addic-
tion, I should make a note about my strategy in defining those
terms. There is no one, uncontested theory of natural kinds, let
alone addiction, nor do I wish to settle the dispute about which
account is best4. I aim to give an account of natural kinds that
is generous in what it counts as natural kinds and one of addic-
tion that limits what it counts as addiction to clear cases. For if
4I am not critiquing any definition of addiction in favor of any other, rather, I am
pointing out inadequacies with various definitions. My main point is that whatever
definition of addiction one chooses, there are problems applying it to all cases of
what we call addiction. Against the disease conception, I argue that no mechanism
can account for the properties of an agent understood as “addiction” in all cases;
for the purposive conception I argue that the definition itself has trouble explaining
some cases of what we call addiction.
addiction is not a natural kind given a wide account of natural
kinds and a narrow one of addiction, then it stands to reason that
the same would be true of a narrower account of kinds – one that
demanded more for a category to count as a kind – or a broader
one of addiction, where more varied cases count as addiction.
I understand the HPC theory of kinds to be the broadest
account available. Other theories allow far less variance within
members of a kind, by requiring members of a kind to share either
property sets rather than clusters or microstructural essences. In
either case, addiction as a natural kind would be a non-starter in
virtue of the variance in behaviors that count as addictive from
case to case or the lack of a shared essence in life sciences kinds in
the first place5. Similarly, I restrict my discussion to addiction to
substances, rather than addiction to, e.g., gambling.
I should emphasize that this logic only holds for demarcating
the extensions of addiction and natural kind. That is, it falls short
at restricting the possible intensions, i.e., theories explaining in
virtue of what the extension “addiction” applies to its instances6.
And theories within the disease paradigm do not differ on what
instances count as addiction so much as they do on how to explain
the phenomena exhibited commonly by organisms that count as
addicted. I restrict my discussion to theories within the disease
paradigm because it is the paradigm investigating addiction at the
level most salient for natural kinds, that of mechanisms underlying
the property cluster.
NATURAL KINDS IN PSYCHOLOGY (AND BIOLOGY)
The HPC theory of natural kinds is designed to balance accounting
for the inherent variability in biological and psychological kinds
while at the same time preserving explanatory value in terms of
prediction and induction (11, 12). This is an attractive model
not only because it is gaining traction across the life sciences
and being given credence by practicing experimental cognitive
neuroscientists [e.g., Ref. (13)], but, more importantly for my pur-
poses, because it is expressly designed to account for the variation
inherent to categories such as addiction.
The two basic tenets of the HPC view are: (1) that kinds are
defined by a cluster of properties that reliably occur in mem-
bers of the kind and (2) that the properties co-occur in virtue
of some shared causal or mechanistic structure7 – the homeosta-
tic in HPC refers to causally maintained co-occurrence. Species
are paradigmatic HPC kinds in biology (11, 14).
The challenge for the HPC view is to articulate which categories
count as kinds given the fact that members of a kind vary so much.
There must be a way to determine: (a) what properties can count
in the homeostatic cluster that defines the kind and (b) when a set
of properties is truly a cluster and not just an arbitrary set. Both
5For instance, Hacking (59) endorses family resemblances but not clusters (where
the former must count as somehow co-sufficient and the latter, as I have explained,
need not) as well as restricts natural kinds to human-independent categories. Yet
stricter still are more “traditional” accounts of natural kinds which pose essences as
necessary and sufficient conditions for kindhood [e.g., Ref. (60)] On such accounts,
addiction would not be a natural kind: it has no metaphysically special essence, and
it is a kind defined at least in part by human behaviors.
6I am thankful to Bennett Foddy for bringing up this point in review.
7More precisely, the members must have those properties generated by mecha-
nisms/sets of mechanisms that are tokens of the same type.

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
questions are answered by trying to maximize the importance of
causal influence: it is properties that are causally basic, as opposed
to surface properties that are part of the cluster, and it is when
causally basic properties co-occur in virtue of a mechanism or set
of mechanisms that the set of properties is truly a cluster (12).
THE HPC VIEW: KEY CONCEPTS
Properties can be said to be superficial or causally basic: causally
basic properties are those by which the other properties can be fully
(perhaps reductively) explained. For instance, the causally basic
properties of the kind “human” are things like the ability to inter-
breed and sharing a common ancestry. The superficial properties
of the kind human are just those properties that humans share that
other categories/kinds don’t: having opposable thumbs isn’t part of
the surface property list of humans because it is shared by a higher
taxa (primates), but having a complex grammar or a prefrontal
cortex larger than other mammals are. The fact that humans have
and share these properties can be explained by humans’ shared
ancestry and history of breeding.
But these causally basic properties are distinct from the mecha-
nisms that cause them to co-occur in humans. Selection and repro-
duction might be what cause the surface properties to occur, but
the mechanisms of evolution – such as invasive gene suppression
and advantageous mutation – are what explain the co-occurrence
of those causally basic properties themselves. The mechanisms
make the set a cluster, or, better, they make the cluster a homeostatic
cluster [example from Ref. (12)].
Note that the former causal relationship is stronger than the
latter. Uniquely human surface properties can be largely if not
entirely explained by the selective history and ancestral genotype
of human conspecifics (arguably plus the environmental pressures
on them), but no mechanism of gene flow can fully explain those
abilities without an additional story being told about the particular
historical facts of human reproduction.
Thus, a kind is defined by a cluster of causally basic properties
whose clustering is the result of an underlying mechanism/set of
mechanisms.
DELINEATING KINDS FROMMERE CATEGORIES
Consider an example from evolutionary biology. Squids have eyes
much like humans (or whichever taxa our particular kind of visual
system belongs to). However, the set of human and squid eyes is
considered a homoplasy – a shared trait in virtue of distinct evo-
lutionary histories and mechanisms – rather than an homology,
or a shared trait in virtue of a shared ancestral history (14, 15). No
putative natural kind to which human eyes belong (e.g., primate
eyes, mammal eyes) includes squid eyes (16).
Yet, human and squid eyes have some of the same surface prop-
erties (the ability to detect objects, motion, light changes, etc.) and
possibly in virtue of the same causally basic properties (a retina, a
pupil, etc.). And we can subsume some basic generalizations under
a category that includes human and squid eyes, such as that they
will both detect an organism of sufficient size moving across their
field of view and send this information to the brain. So why don’t
human and squid eyes count as a natural kind?
Griffiths refers to the causally basic properties whose co-
occurrence is supported not by random chance (as in the case of
homoplasy) but by mechanisms to be maximally predictive (14).
This term is a little misleading in that one might expect maximally
predictive categories to be the categories that currently possess the
largest cluster of properties.
However, this notion of a maximally predictive category can be
made clear by understanding that science is an ever-progressing
discipline, and all entities studied by biology or psychology, be they
organisms, parts of organisms, mental states, etc., will have proper-
ties that have yet to be identified, let alone understood, or explained
scientifically. The question, then, is, what is the best way to pre-
dict which categories will explain clustering or co-occurrence of
properties to be discovered or explained in the future? The answer
provided by the HPC view is that the best way to predict future
clustering is not by present clustering. Rather, the best way to pre-
dict future clustering is by reference to mechanisms that explain
the co-occurrence of the properties in a cluster.
HPC KINDS AND REVISABILITY
The fact that natural kind claims are warranted on the basis of
mechanisms, rather than on the basis of property clusters, is just
one facet of the HPC view’s commitment to the ongoing nature
of scientific practice. Wilson and colleagues sum up this commit-
ment well, claiming that “[t]he HPC view carries a commitment
to a thoroughgoing naturalism, according to which philosophical
reflection on science is continuous with and epistemically regu-
lated by ongoing scientific practice” [Ref. (12), p. 202]. This view
entails not only a commitment to categories that will be most
useful for predictions in future scientific endeavors, but also a
commitment to take seriously the results of those endeavors.
Because science is an ongoing practice, scientific claims are
always falsifiable or empirically revisable. This means that all nat-
ural kind claims are understood as working hypotheses. In Boyd’s
words, they are all a posteriori claims (11). More simply, the con-
tent of a kind term is whatever the best current science tells us it is:
to paraphrase Griffiths (14), addiction means whatever psychology
tells us is going on in the mind/brains of addicted individuals.
The upshot of this reasoning is that when I make a claim that
“addiction is not a natural kind,” I am making a claim tantamount
to a working hypothesis, up for revision if the best current science
of addiction changes. But this does not mean the claim is unwar-
ranted at this time, it just means it will never be immune from
scrutiny in light of new evidence.
ADDICTION AS HPC KIND?
The surface properties of addiction are addictive behaviors or
“the addictive phenotype” and the causally basic properties are
the person-level functions that putatively explain the phenotype,
including psychological factors like habitual desire and loss of con-
trol (17), as well as environmental factors captured at a high level
of abstraction (e.g., opportunities for employment/advancement).
I discuss the causally basic properties proposed by varieties of the
disease paradigm in detail in the next section.
Which mechanisms underlie the co-occurrence of these
causally basic properties is the primary question addressed in the
cognitive neuroscience of addiction. When we discuss “a mecha-
nism for addiction,” what we mean is a mechanism that explains
to co-occurrence of some or all of the causally basic properties in

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
the cluster. Thus, according to Everitt and Robbins (7), behavioral
control being shifted from prefrontal areas and the ventral stria-
tum to the dorsal striatum is the mechanism responsible for the
property of having behavior insensitive to the agent’s conscious
desire or executive control, which in turn explains the compulsive
drug-taking behavior.
This kind of mechanism, realized in the brain of individuals,
is described on a different level – one might say a different kind
of mechanism altogether – than the mechanisms of evolution that
fix the cluster of properties for the species human. Nonetheless,
the important point for kind terms is that they both play the right
causal role, that is, they explain the occurrence of the causally
basic properties, but to which the causally basic properties cannot
be reduced to them.
My argument is that, given the candidate mechanisms proposed
in literature, at least one class of cases of addiction as delineated by
substance, the proposed mechanism fails to underlie the causally
basic properties. I contend, in essence, that the category “addic-
tion” is like a category of eyes that includes both human and squid
eyes, whereas the categories “S-addiction” and “T-addiction,” etc.,
are like categories that include only human eyes (or some other
category of eyes defined by homology and not homoplasy).
I should clarify that I am not claiming instances of addiction to
different substances are themselves an example of convergent evo-
lution. Rather, I am arguing that a category based on convergent
evolution, i.e., one that includes both human and squid eyes, and
a category “addiction” including addiction to all substances, stand
in the same relation to categories that are genuine natural kinds.
They are examples of categories that share a property cluster but
not in virtue of a common mechanism.
ADDICTION AND LOSS OF CONTROL
The DSM defines addiction based on patterns of use, that is to say,
behavioral criteria. But experimental models focus on something
like loss of control. Why? When seeking a mechanism to explain
the property cluster of addiction – something in virtue of which
addiction applies as a property to individuals – we need to look
for a mechanism for something. In this section, I’ll discuss why loss
of control is an appropriate candidate to be explained mechanis-
tically. For it is the mechanisms that seek to explain loss of control
with which I will take issue.
First, one cannot look for a mechanism responsible for a behav-
ior on the neurocognitive level without a prior understanding
of the psychological function that explains behavior: there is
no brain area for aggression, rather, there are functions, realized
neuroanatomically, that explain aggressive behaviors (18).
Second, a behavioral definition necessarily casts the net too
widely, as it cannot distinguish between an addict and an enthusi-
ast in the right conditions [Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard (19),
though, see Griffiths (66) for reasons why we might not want to
make such a distinction]. By enthusiast I mean someone who has
a strong desire for something but one that is completely within the
agent’s control. Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard give the example
of an avid golfer, though in theory this could apply to an avid
drug user who is not addicted (be it from not being addicted yet,
not having the predisposition, etc.). An enthusiast who needs to
travel somewhere for business where he or she cannot obtain drugs
has good reason not to use drugs, and, will subsequently abstain.
However, suppose for the purposes of this thought experiment
that the enthusiast never encountered such a situation as a mat-
ter of chance: what, behaviorally, would distinguish him from an
addict? Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard (19) therefore suggest that
having a motivational structure that includes a loss of control is
an essential part of addiction. Of course, having no control but no
desire to use drugs also does not constitute addiction, so it must
be both8.
The HPC account need not entirely ignore behavior as a part of
addiction. I suggest that the addictive phenotype, i.e., addiction-
related behaviors as described in the DSM, are the surface proper-
ties, explained by the causally basic properties which can be loosely
described at a coarse grain as the functions underlying having a
strong and habitual desire and a loss of control.9 Further, it is
the causally basic properties that are supposed to be definitive of
the kind, and thus these properties constitute a valid definition,
whereas the behaviors are not causally basic. Finally, person-level
properties such as loss of control stand in just the right relation to
subpersonal functional mechanisms: the latter can account for the
occurrence of the former without fully (reductively) explaining
it (20).
I emphasize that the causally basic properties can be described –
in the sense that they can be grouped together – as“loss of control,”
not that loss of control is itself a causally basic property. For loss of
control, when understood at anything but the coarsest of grains, is
far too heterogeneous to count as property, and thus a candidate
to be causally basic10. First of all, loss of control itself is a broader
category than loss of control in addiction, which refers to some
specific sort (or sorts) of loss of control. Further, addiction the-
orists disagree on how to cash out loss of control in terms of the
functions that generate behavior which can be described as not
controlled (to some extent) by the agent.
Indeed, each theorist I discuss cashes out loss of control in a
different way: for the aberrant learning hypothesis, the causally
basic property is the habit-based behaviors that are not sensi-
tive to executive control systems, whereas for the frontostriatal
dysfunction model it is impaired activity in the executive sys-
tems themselves – understood at a fine grain to include multiple
functional systems such as incentive salience attribution, emo-
tion regulation, executive override functions, and others – that
are the causally basic properties. Notably, some even propose
different numbers of causally basic functions related to loss of
control: the aberrant learning and incentive sensitization hypothe-
ses give one functional neuroadaptation primacy11 whereas the
frontostriatal model suggests the equal contribution of several
functions.
8Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard (19) add a third criterion, that the addiction causes
harm, though they also suggest that loss of control might be inherently harmful.
This part of the definition is not necessary for the purposes of this discussion; my
arguments do not turn on any explanation of harm.
9I should note that not all theorists endorse some form of loss of control as central
[e.g., Ref. (61)]. However, the theorists discussed, that is, those in the disease par-
adigm of addiction, do. See my (62) for a discussion on the unity of addiction in
Pickard’s theory.
10I am thankful to Bennett Foddy for raising this point in review.
11Everitt and Robbins (7) do discuss the role of the prefrontal cortex distinct from
the dorsal striatum, however, they also later suggest that prefrontal neuroadaptations
may temporally precede addiction (63).

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
When I say loss of control in general, I mean to refer to those
causally basic properties hypothesized by the respective theories
discussed here that can be grouped together as underlying some
sort of loss of control, and not some property itself.
The key point is that the way in which addiction according to
the disease paradigm putatively maps to HPC kinds can now be
stated more precisely. The surface properties are addictive behav-
iors, the causally basic properties are the functions suggested by
the theorists related to loss of control, and the mechanisms are
the neurocognitive adaptations proposed to be causally relevant
to those functions.
THEORIES OF ADDICTION
The disease conception of addiction is close to the received view
in cognitive neuroscience. Melis and colleagues sum up the view
well:
[N]ot different from traditional diseases, drug addiction
bears with it a number of biological abnormalities. which
justifies the label disease. Although repetitive use of drugs
affects different organs. the primary target appears to be the
brain – thus brain disease [Ref. (21), p. 102].
In this section, I’ll discuss some various proposals for relevant
mechanisms. I’ll then detail how the suggested mechanisms in
each theory fail to account for a class of substances.
Varieties of the disease conception suggest different mecha-
nisms on the level of functional neurocircuits – that is, sets of
brain areas with assigned functions – to explain the occurrence
of the causally basic properties. I’ll discuss a few prevalent mod-
els: (1) Everitt and Robbins (7) suggest that aberrant associative
learning results in uncontrollable habits realized in dopaminergic
projections to and within the dorsal striatum, and that addiction
involves transfer of behavioral control from voluntary reward-
based systems to these nearly reflexive habit learning systems via
dopaminergic projections from the ventral to the dorsal striatum.
(2) Robinson and Berridge (22–24) suggest that the mesolimbic
dopamine (DA) system malfunctions in addiction. They sug-
gest that the function of the system is to compute the “incen-
tive salience” of a stimulus, or how much an organism “wants”
(as opposed to “likes”) that stimulus. They hypothesize that, in
addiction, the system changes to habitually overvalue drug-related
stimuli at the expense of other classes of stimuli. (3) Volkow and
colleagues (6, 10, 25) suggest that several neurocircuits involv-
ing various prefrontal control regions underlie different aspects of
loss of control in addiction, and that these circuits “conspire” to
overwhelm cognitive control systems.
In each case, evidence shows that at least one substance of abuse
violates a major prediction of the theory such that it is not obvi-
ous that the putative mechanism is operant in those cases. For the
former two, cannabis is the exception; for the third, opiates are.
THEORY ONE: ABERRANT LEARNING AND THE DORSAL STRIATUM
Everitt, Robbins, and colleagues (7, 26) suggest that a dopamin-
ergic neurocognitive circuit focused around the dorsal striatum
plays a central role in the generation of addictive behaviors. Specif-
ically, they suggest that behavioral control shifts from normal
reward-based learning functions realized in the mesolimbic DA
system12 to habit-based learning functions realized in the dorsal
striatum.
The dorsal striatum is involved in unmediated stimulus-
response associations, as opposed to mediated S-R associations
(27). A mediated S-R association is one that is related to some
other mental factor. The relationship between food (S) and eat-
ing (R) is generally a mediated response: a rat will eat food if it’s
hungry, but not if it’s full (under normal circumstances). Thus the
food-stimulus/eating-behavior association is mediated by hunger
levels. These associations are realized in a neurocognitive circuit
involving the ventral striatum, ventral tegmental area (VTA), and
OFC – essentially, the mesolimbic DA system (27).
An unmediated association is an automatic and involuntary
association between stimulus and response, such as walking into a
dark room and reaching for/moving a light switch.
Everitt and Robbins suggest that addiction occurs when drug-
taking and drug-seeking behavior cease to be generated by medi-
ated S-R mechanisms and begin to be generated by unmediated
ones. In functional terms, drug-taking and drug-seeking become
automatic, involuntary responses to drug-related stimuli (or con-
ditioned cues) in addiction, whereas in drug use that is not
addiction, they are mediated by some psychological factor. In an
elaborate series of experiments, Everitt and Robbins have demon-
strated that activation of the dorsal striatum is involved in the
animal model of relapse: drug-seeking behavior after prolonged
abstinence in response to conditioned stimuli.
A major prediction of this model is that these dopaminergic
circuits in the dorsal striatum change over time in response to the
influx of dopamine from the drug of choice. This can be mea-
sured experimentally in a few ways. First, dopamine type 2/type
3 (D2/3) receptor availability will decrease in the dorsal stria-
tum in addicted individuals. This lowered receptor availability is
the brain’s response to repeated, externally induced dopaminer-
gic innervations: rather than over-activating constantly, the brain
raises the threshold for activation in terms of required D2/3 levels.
To be clear, it is not the receptors themselves that are hypothesized
to play a causal role in addiction, rather, measuring receptor levels
is intended to indirectly measure the causally efficacious dopamine
activity13. And this prediction is confirmed in many substances,
including cocaine (28), alcohol (29), opiates (30), methampheta-
mine (31), and nicotine (32). Yet D2/3 receptor availability is not
affected within statistically significant levels in either adolescents
(33) or adults (34) recovering from cannabis addiction.
A second experimental model is to investigate the level of
dopamine transporters in and around the dorsal striatum in vivo,
which also decreases as a response to repeated, artificially induced
influxes of dopamine. In a study by Leroy and colleagues (35), stri-
atal and extrastriatal dopamine transporter levels were compared
between three groups: healthy controls, individuals addicted to
nicotine, and individuals addicted to nicotine and cannabis. The
latter two groups showed no significant difference in dopamine
12The postulated function of the mesolimbic DA system differs between theories of
addiction. For Everitt and Robbins, it is involved in the learning of reward value,
whereas, for, e.g., Robinson and Berridge (22, 23), it is involved in the attribution of
incentive salience.
13I am thankful to Serge Ahmed for raising this point in review.

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
transporter levels, but both demonstrated a significant difference
compared to controls, suggesting that cannabis – unlike nicotine –
does not decrease dopamine transporter levels in and around the
dorsal striatum.
Therefore, the data available on dopamine activity in the dor-
sal striatum in cannabis addiction that has been collected thus
far points to the conclusion that cannabis, in contrast to virtually
every other drug of abuse, does not involve the neuroadaptation
proposed to underlie addiction in this theory.
THEORY TWO: INCENTIVE SENSITIZATION
Robinson and Berridge (22–24) agree with Everitt and Robbins
that regular drug use starts out affecting the mesolimbic DA sys-
tem, but disagree on the function of that system as well as the
location of the salient neuroadaptations for the transition to addic-
tion. They suggest the mesolimbic DA circuit computes incentive
salience, or the extent to which an organism “wants” a stimu-
lus, as opposed to – and independent of – the extent to which
the organism “likes” it, and this function itself is compromised in
addiction.
All drugs of abuse produce a rush of dopamine to the VTA,
which transmits more throughout the circuit (21, 36). Accord-
ing to the incentive sensitization theory, this causes the system to
improperly compute the incentive salience value of the drug in
terms of its objective benefit, significantly overvaluing the sub-
stance that caused the DA release. Over time, the brain builds up
a tolerance to higher DA levels, and as a result, salience values
of stimuli across the board, so to speak, are devalued – except
for drug-related stimuli, which are re-overvalued each time the
drug is consumed. In functional terms, addiction occurs when we
automatically value drug-related stimuli as the stimuli with the
highest incentive salience value (whether we consciously endorse
this valuation or not). This process is referred to as incentive
sensitization.
A major prediction of this theory, then, is that non-drug-related
rewards such as food, water, and sex (though not money, presum-
ably because it becomes associated in the brains of addicts with
obtaining drugs) generate less activation in mesolimbic DA sys-
tem areas, especially the ventral striatum, than in conspecifics, and
drug-related stimuli generate greater activation. And this predic-
tion has been confirmed in addiction to alcohol (37), cocaine (38),
and nicotine (39). But again, this prediction is not borne out with
cannabis: heavy cannabis users exhibit greater ventral striatum
activation in response to cannabis-related stimuli more than non-
users, but they also exhibit greater activation to non-drug-related
stimuli (40)14! Further, Wolfing and colleagues (41) found that
14The findings of Nestor and colleagues suggest cannabis is a problem for any theory
of addiction that posits greater VS activation in response to drug-related stimuli in
the face of decreased activation to non-drug-related “rewarding” stimuli. An influ-
ential theory of addiction that I have not discussed makes a similar prediction with
a similar neural basis but with a different functional story. The “allostatic” theory
of addiction [e.g., Ref. (64)] suggests that repeated, externally induced dopaminer-
gic innervations and the resulting hypodopaminergic state generate an anhedonic
affective/nocioceptive state in addicted individuals, who then use the drug of their
preference to retain normal hedonic functioning. Similarly, addiction is supposed
to result in reward-system driven overvaluation of drug-related and undervaluation
of non-drug-related stimuli, except here the over/undervaluations are computed in
verbal reports as well as psychophysiological measurements (EEG
and skin conductance resonance or SCR) showed that habitual
cannabis users value valenced non-drug stimuli greater than do
controls15.
An experimental paradigm related to incentive sensitization
at the neural level is behavioral sensitization. In this paradigm,
animal models are noted to initially have increased spontaneous
locomotor activity in response to drugs of abuse, and this activity
decreases with repeated exposure, hence behavioral sensitization.
And the process is hypothesized to mimic sensitization at the
neural level [Varvel et al. (42); though, see Ref. (43) for a challenge
to this connection]. Varvel and colleagues performed an elaborate
series of experiments on comparisons between behavioral sensiti-
zation to methamphetamine and to cannabis. In all iterations in
which there was evidence for behavioral sensitization to metham-
phetamine, there was no evidence for behavioral sensitization to
cannabis.
Functionally, then, this theory runs into a problem explaining
the occurrence of strong, habitual desire with loss of control in
cannabis addiction. If drugs are the only thing of value to an agent
(in the agent’s unconscious valuation), then the agent will pre-
dictably keep taking drugs at the expense of other rewards. But,
according to this data, cannabis use doesn’t necessarily make one
want cannabis at the expense of other things, it makes one want
everything more. Thus it is not clear why the agent would prefer
the drug over other non-drug rewards. In other words, it might
explain the agent’s becoming a hedonist in general, but not an
addict to a particular substance.
THEORY THREE: THE FRONTOSTRIATAL DYSFUNCTION MODEL
Volkow and colleagues (9, 44) proposed a decade ago that pre-
frontal cortical areas, involved in executive control and inhibition
(among other functions) in normal brain function also underlie
the loss of control aspect of addiction. Specifically, the systems
are compromised in terms of overall functional capacity, and, as
a result, exhibit decreased activity via a variety of measures. In
other words, an agent’s normal self-control systems fail to block
drug-taking and drug-seeking behavior, resulting in use that is out
of the agent’s control.
More recently (10, 25), they have expanded this model to dis-
cuss particular aspects of compromised inhibition which are each
assigned to a specific neurocircuit involving distinct subregions of
the PFC; in large part this move is simply a reflection of a better
understanding of the heterogeneity of PFC function [Goldstein
and Volkow (10); for a review of PFC areas and their respective
functions, see Ref. (45)]. Many of these circuits involve projections
between the PFC and ventral striatum, however, I focus on PFC
related data here.
While the full details of this intricate model are beyond the
scope of this discussion, a crucial point is that the various neuro-
circuits are postulated not to independently promote aspects of the
terms of reward value rather than incentive salience. But the suggested physiological
basis for this computation is still the mesolimbic DA system, and thus the evidence
from cannabis is problematic.
15However, by this study’s measurements – in contrast to the Gruber data – habitual
cannabis users did not overvalue non-drug rewards to the same extent as they did
drug rewards in comparison to controls.

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
addictive phenotype but rather to feed off of each other and “con-
spire” to produce the addictive phenotype (6). Thus, for addiction
to be a natural kind on this account, the set of mechanisms must
explain addiction across substances.
However, opiates cause a problem for predictions involving sev-
eral of the proposed circuits. Indeed, there are myriad differences
between opiate and either cocaine or stimulant addiction summa-
rized by Badiani and colleagues (1). I will focus here on the data
they discuss that is most relevant to the frontostriatal theory.
According to Volkow and colleagues (10, 25), the medial PFC
as a whole is involved in several relevant neurocircuits, including
one underlying the balancing of immediate gratification with the
attainment of long-term goals, and this circuit’s function is com-
promised in addiction. Because of the decreased activity in the
area, the theory predicts that spiny neuron density will increase
in the mPFC (as a homeostatic response to lowered neurotrans-
mitter levels in virtue of decreased activity). And this result has
been confirmed in cocaine, methamphetamine, and cannabis (46,
47). However, animal models of heroin addiction show the oppo-
site: decreased spiny neuron density in the mPFC in abstinent rats
(46). Further evidence regarding differences in mPFC morphology
come from measuring long-term potentiation (LTP) in GABAer-
gic synapses in animal models in vivo. Repeated cocaine exposure
suppresses LTP in the mPFC, and, subsequently, abstinence facili-
tated LTP reformation (48, 49). Abstinence after repeated exposure
to heroin, however, had no significant effect on LTP (50).
Moreover, distinct subregions of the medial PFC, especially the
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), are implicated independently of the
mPFC as a whole in the function of other circuits relevant to self
control in the PFC. Specifically, the vmPFC is involved in stimulus
valuation and salience attribution as well as emotion regulation
(10).
Yet evidence suggests that these subregions are differentially
involved in addiction to cocaine and opiates. For heroin, context-
induced reinstatement can be attenuated by inhibiting the vmPFC
(51). This is plausible given the theoretical interpretation of the
circuits in which the vmPFC is involved. For it would seem to
be that the reason relapse can be cue induced in the first place
is because the associated cues are given such a high valuation or
attributed salience. However, for cocaine, context-induced rein-
statement can be attenuated when the dorsal, but not the ventral
mPFC is inhibited (52). Not only is this result functionally diffi-
cult to explain since the dmPFC is not implicated in valuation and
salience attribution, but it demonstrates that the involvement of
PFC neuroadaptations in addiction cannot be assumed to be the
same across substances.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CATEGORY OF ADDICTION
At least according to the best neuroscientific theories of addic-
tion available, there is no mechanism underlying loss of control
in addiction across substances. I thus argue that, barring further
evidence in the future to the contrary, addiction is not a natural
kind. In this section, I’ll discuss what ought to be done to find nat-
ural kinds in addiction science. First, however, I want to address
the scope of the claim I’m making. Specifically, I want to address
the possibility of what finding further evidence in the future to the
contrary might mean for this claim.
NATURAL KINDS AND THE STATUS OF ADDICTION SCIENCE
Because the HPC view is committed to the best current science, its
claims are always working hypotheses, up for revision in light of
future empirical evidence. This means that when I claim “addic-
tion is not a natural kind,” I am making a statement tantamount to
a working hypothesis, warranted by the state of science at this time.
However, there are two ways the science could change such that
the data would no longer support my contention, and I want to
address both possibilities. First, a future theory of the mechanisms
of addiction could be introduced that would meet the criteria I’ve
discussed for natural kindhood, i.e., that would explain addiction
across substances in terms of a common causal mechanism or set
of mechanisms. Such a theory could be a reformulation or aug-
mentation of a current theory, or a novel hypothesis. Second, the
experimental findings that have warranted the theories already
discussed may be invalidated. I discuss each of these possibilities
in turn, and suggest reasons as to why I am still justified in making
the claim that addiction is not a natural kind.
What if future research finds mechanisms of addiction that
truly apply to addiction across substances? In that event, the basis
for warranting kind claims would change to respect the new find-
ings, and, subsequently my thesis would be unwarranted – barring
research even further in the future to the contrary of those claims.
However, such a possibility is in principle entirely consistent with
making the claim at the current time that addiction is not a natural
kind, since this sort of claim always entails a status as a working
hypothesis.
Because mechanisms that unify kinds are what warrant the
making of natural kind claims, and because these mechanistic
findings are always themselves up for revision in light of new evi-
dence, a kind theorist is left with two options: make no kind claims
at all until the science is essentially static (e.g., it seems rather safe
to assume that the unity of an element category in chemistry like
gold will not be challenged), or make kind claims that are tanta-
mount to working hypotheses. But it is the current generalizations
that we make that enable science to progress: the claim that addic-
tion is not a natural kind is based on past science, and aimed to
help future science (and philosophy; see S 6). The empirical litera-
ture discussed here was generated because scientists were studying
the nature of what they took to be a valid category, and this study
has produced scientific progress. In other words, science is well
served by making and augmenting working hypotheses about the
unity/disunity of various categories.
A distinct possibility is that the theories that warrant my claims
about the disunity of the category addiction themselves will be fal-
sified by future science. And this possibility is at least prima facie
plausible. For instance,Ahmed (53,54) rightly questions the addic-
tion status of animal models who have been given no choice but to
repeatedly take the drug presented to them, which calls into ques-
tion many of the experimental findings on which these theories
are based. If a radical version of this claim were true such that none
of the current theories proposed were valid enough to warrant any
claims about natural kinds, what would that mean for my claim
that addiction is not a natural kind? Samuels (55) suggests that
when studying a putative category where no potential, reasonably
supported mechanistic basis has been proposed, we take the work-
ing hypothesis that the category is a HPC kind based on similarity

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
of surface properties. And addiction would seem, at least prima
facie, to qualify as having similar surface properties (addiction-
related behaviors) for instances of addiction across substances,
though a more robust discussion of the behavioral and epidemi-
ological patterns of addicts to various substances would need to
happen before such a claim could be made with any amount of
confidence.
However, I do not understand the possibility that the experi-
mental basis for these theories may be invalidated to undermine
my claim that addiction, as the science stands right now, is not
a natural kind. For such an argument is a criticism of what is
currently the dominant paradigm in addiction, and a distinct one
from the point I am making. The dominant paradigm of addic-
tion, as I understand it, suggests that: (1) results from the animal
models of addiction used over the last half century or so project
to instances of addiction in humans and (2) that mechanistic
explanations of addiction to one substance project to instances
of addiction to other substances16. Both of these claims are still
part of the dominant paradigm; I am challenging the latter claim
and arguments like Ahmed’s are challenging the former. And while
I am sympathetic to Ahmed’s argument, I am not, in this discus-
sion myself, challenging the projectability from animal models to
humans. Rather, I am making a separate challenge to a dominant
view that still largely accepts this tenet.
THE SEARCH FOR KIND TERMS
When investigation of a category previously thought to be a nat-
ural kind fails to reveal a mechanism underlying the property
cluster, the natural kind theorist is committed to one of two alter-
natives to rectify the situation: category revision and category
replacement (14, 56). The commitment to category replacement or
revision in light of empirical evidence is part and parcel of the HPC
view’s commitment to scientific practice. A common mechanistic
basis among members of a category is what warrants natural kind
claims, and since the mechanistic claims are empirically revisable,
so are the claims about which categories count as natural kinds.
To again paraphrase Griffiths (14), this is not to say that nothing
is happening in individuals we refer to as addicted. It just means
that classifying them as suffering from addiction might not be
particularly illuminating as to what’s going on in their brains. And
the strategies of category replacement and/or revision are the next
step in the search for categories that will be illuminating.
In this section, I’ll go over how these two strategies might be
used by an addiction scientist to find valid natural kinds. I shall
also explain why I prefer the category replacement strategy, where
we cease to discuss in terms of “addiction” simpliciter and come
to discuss patients in terms of “S-addiction” or “T-addiction.”
CATEGORY REVISION
Category revision means rethinking the extension of the category,
i.e., the set of entities to which it refers. And there is a move avail-
able to the addiction theorist to salvage some category similar to
addiction.
16I understand projection in this sense to roughly mean an inference from a pattern
in a specific subset of samples to another, larger specific set or subset (65). See Boyd
(11) for further discussion of projectability and natural kinds.
For whichever mechanistic account of addiction ends up being
correct, addiction theorists might simply revise the extension of
“addiction” to refer to cases of addiction caused by the right
mechanisms. Thus, if the aberrant learning model is correct,
it might be the case that there is a natural kind of disorder
encompassing addiction to cocaine, nicotine, alcohol, etc., but
not cannabis. When looking for the common mechanisms of
addiction, researchers might just cease to demand that patients
putatively addicted to cannabis display evidence of those spe-
cific neuroadaptations. (If the frontostriatal dysfunction account
is correct, we’d have to jettison heroin addiction from the natural
kind.)
CATEGORY REPLACEMENT
Another option is to replace addiction as a category with related
categories that better track distinct mechanisms. Notably, the
mechanisms underlying loss of control in addiction do not seem to
vary across users of the same substance; minimally, I am not argu-
ing here that they do. Thus, nothing I have suggested contradicts –
and indeed, the evidence might be said to corroborate17 – the idea
that “cocaine addiction” and “cannabis addiction” for example, are
natural kinds.
Moreover, under such a conception it might be the case that
addiction to two (or more) substances end up using the same set
of mechanisms. For instance, suppose cocaine and methampheta-
mine are found to have the same mechanism or set of mechanisms
that end up being the consensus for underlying loss of control in
addiction. Then patients addicted to either substance would be
members of a category that counted as a single natural kind.
REASONS TO PREFER CATEGORY REPLACEMENT
While both category revision of addiction (to exclude cannabis or
opiates) and category replacement of addiction with“S-addiction,”
“T-addiction,” etc., are both equally valid strategies, I find the
second option more attractive.
Whichever theory is correct, category replacement, at least uti-
lizing the strategy I have suggested, might lead us to the same
place as category revision. That is, it is possible that if the aberrant
learning hypothesis is correct, and if this is the case, investigation
would then determine that S-/T-addiction are the only two real
kinds, where S is cannabis and T is all substances except cannabis,
just as we would with category revision if the aberrant learning
hypothesis were correct.
I argue that if this is the case, and we would arrive at the same
conclusion either way, then the claim will be on far better theoret-
ical standing if arrived at via the second strategy. For it would be
reached as a conclusion of investigation rather than as a stipulated
premise.
Fundamentally, the lesson I hope we would draw from the
discrepancies between substances of addiction is that, given the
current state of addiction science, assuming a unitary category of
addiction is no longer justified. At the beginning stages of investi-
gation – for instance, when it was discovered that all drugs of abuse
17I should note that this might be a relic of the experimental construct which tests
a group of individuals in treatment for addiction to a particular substance against a
control group of non-users or occasional users of the same drug.

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
target or act on the mesolimbic circuit with dopamine (36) – it
might have been reasonable to infer as a working hypothesis the
unity of addiction from the unity of acute use. But that was when
our best evidence about long-term addiction was indirect, i.e.,
from short-term use, and the situation is now different.
One could object that perhaps addiction per se is analogous to
a higher taxa category in species biology. That is, S-addiction is
like the species human and addiction is, for example, the genus
primates18. But this analogy does not work: in the case of taxa,
the relevant mechanisms are evolutionary, and all taxa share some
ancestry (indeed, biological categories only count as taxa if they
do, otherwise the putative taxon is merely a homoplasy). However,
in the case of addiction, the relevant mechanisms are physiolog-
ical/neurocognitive, and these mechanisms either play a causally
efficacious role in the drug-related behavior of addicts to a given
substance, or they do not.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTISTS AND
PHILOSOPHERS
I hope I have demonstrated in this paper that natural kinds are
just a simple yet relatively precise way to capture the concep-
tual commitments of theoretical constructs such as “addiction”
(or “emotion,” or “species”).
In this concluding section, I wish to discuss why various mem-
bers of the scientific and philosophical community might benefit
from replacing “addiction” with “S-addiction.” All researchers
make predictions or inferences on the basis of category mem-
bership. And in all cases, researchers benefit from using categories
that are supported by underlying mechanisms.
BASIC SCIENCE
Basic scientists are concerned with making the most powerful
explanations they can, and the relevance of natural kinds is thus
direct. Natural kinds are categories that are maximally predictive,
and categories that fail to be natural kinds ipso facto fail to be
maximally predictive, no matter how much their members have in
common.
Natural kinds just are the categories scientists ought to use for
the basis of making predictions, and thus for the design of exper-
iments. It is telling that experimental cohorts are rarely if ever
composed of patients with addictions to distinct substances (that
is, a patient with S-addiction and one with T-addiction in the same
cohort, as opposed to comorbidity studies): conclusions would be
very difficult to draw.
CLINICAL SCIENCE
Clinicians are most concerned with what ameliorates the condi-
tion of their patients. But again, mechanisms matter. Supposing
that, say, the aberrant learning hypothesis is correct, and we begin
to develop drugs that target the dorsal striatum. Those drugs
wouldn’t work for instances of cannabis addiction. Similarly, while
behavioral measures might target higher-level phenomena seem-
ingly independent of mechanism, the mechanism still matters.
Therapies that work to create and reinforce new associations will
18I am thankful to Alex Madva for raising this point in response to an earlier draft.
work well for fixing maladaptive mediated associations but not
unmediated ones (or, minimally, better for the former type than
the latter). Thus if loss of control in addiction to various drugs of
abuse is underwritten by distinct mechanisms, different therapies
will be differentially effective.
Thus clinicians are best served by devising treatments for
“S-addiction” and “T-addiction” rather than addiction per se19.
Simply put, natural kinds form the best basis for diagnosis and
treatment just as they do prediction and induction.
PHILOSOPHY
Moral psychologists are interested in attributions of moral prop-
erties like responsibility and autonomy based on an individual’s
mental composition (or psychology). The relationship between
physical and moral properties – assuming that there is any – is a
topic of great debate and by no means one I shall enter here.
Indeed, it is logically possible that the mechanisms underlying
varieties of loss of control in addiction are irrelevant for the ascrip-
tion of moral properties: it may be that the high level properties
themselves are all that is needed. It might not be a knock against
a naturalistic theory of moral psychology that the mechanistic
level doesn’t matter for moral purposes. And if the mechanis-
tic level doesn’t matter, then a category’s being a natural kind
doesn’t matter for the purposes of generalizations to subsume
moral ascriptions.
However, there is reason to think that it might. Pickard (5)
suggests that addicts maintain a middle ground in ascriptions of
moral autonomy between full responsibility and full blameless-
ness. Madva (under review) claims (primarily in regard to implicit
bias) that having some but not full control over a behavior might be
a good psychological basis on which to ascribe such partial respon-
sibility. Indeed, he suggests, following Holton (57) that addicts
might exhibit such partial control insofar as “raising the stakes,”
i.e., the rewards for quitting, has significant effects on who is able to
abstain. In other words, if someone can quit in some circumstances
and not others, then that is a good indicator of partial control.
Might the mechanisms underlying loss of control in addiction
have relevance to the magnitude of control lost? It is at least prima
facie an hypothesis worthy of empirical investigation. If Everitt and
Robbins are correct, then, devolution of behavioral control from
ventral to dorsal striatum corresponds with a higher degree of
loss of control than before the “switch.” And thus addictions not
involving this morphological change would not entail the same
magnitude of loss of control. Further, if Holton and colleagues
are right that the ability to quit under a greater variety of cir-
cumstances indicates greater control, then it is also telling that
cannabis users are statistically less likely to seek treatment than
users of other substances (58).
19This is a distinct point from the fact that addiction treatment must be individually
tailored, although that point is certainly valid. However, even the greatest amount
of variation in treatment for any disorder will contain some matter of commonality,
and which categories we base those generalizations on will matter. In other words,
person-to-person variation in treatment for addiction is still variation on the same
theme. Combining my argument with the personal variation insight suggests that
there should be person-to-person variation in “S-addiction” as well as “T-addiction”
but that the addiction-related properties of individuals in group S are statistically
far likelier to resemble each other more than any given individual in group T.

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
In other words, it is at least a hypothesis worth investi-
gating empirically (and a theory worth investigating conceptu-
ally) that different addictions, in virtue of different mechanisms,
differentially contribute to the ascription of moral properties.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I’d like to thank several individuals for their contributions to
this work. First, Matt Barker for a substantive correspondence
on HPCs and natural kinds, as well as David Gard and
Jim Sparrell for discussions on addiction. Additional thanks
to Serge Ahmed and Bennett Foddy for insightful and help-
ful comments in review of this paper. Special thanks to
Hanna Pickard for her assistance as editor in the vari-
ous stages of preparation of this manuscript, and to Alex
Madva, for numerous discussions and comments on multiple
drafts.
REFERENCES
1. Badiani A, Belin D, Epstein D, Calu
D,ShahamY. Opiate versus psychos-
timulant addiction: the differences
do matter. Nat Neurosci Rev (2011)
12:685–700. doi:10.1038/nrn3104
2. Feltenstein MW, See RE. The neuro-
circuitry of addiction: an overview.
Br J Pharmacol (2008) 154:261–74.
doi:10.1038/bjp.2008.51
3. Nestler EJ. Is there a common mol-
ecular pathway for addiction? Nat
Neurosci (2005) 8:1445–9. doi:10.
1038/nn1578
4. Charland LC. Cynthia’s dilemma:
consenting to heroin prescription.
Am J Bioeth (2002) 2(2):37–47. doi:
10.1162/152651602317533686
5. Pickard HA. The instrumental
rationality of addiction.BehavBrain
Sci (2011) 34:320–1. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X1100077X
6. Koob GF, Volkow ND. Neuro-
circuitry of addiction. Neuropsy-
chopharmacology (2010) 35:217–38.
doi:10.1038/npp.2009.110
7. Everitt BJ, Robbins TW. Neural
systems of reinforcement for drug
addiction: from actions to habits
to compulsion. Nat Neurosci (2005)
8:1481–8. doi:10.1038/nn1579
8. Robinson TE, Berridge KC. The
neural basis of drug craving: an
incentive sensitization theory of
addiction. Brain Res Brain Res
Rev (1993) 18:247–91. doi:10.1016/
0165-0173(93)90013-P
9. Goldstein RZ, Volkow ND. Drug
addiction and its underlying neuro-
biological basis: neuroimaging evi-
dence for the involvement of the
frontal cortex. Am J Psychiatry
(2002) 159:1642–52. doi:10.1176/
appi.ajp.159.10.1642
10. Goldstein RZ, Volkow ND. Dys-
function of the prefrontal cortex
in addiction: neuroimaging findings
and clinical implications. Nat Neu-
rosci Rev (2011) 12:652–69. doi:10.
1038/nrn3119
11. Boyd R. Realis, anti-
foundationalism and the enthu-
siasm for natural kinds. Phi-
los Stud (1991) 61:127–48.
doi:10.1007/BF00385837
12. Wilson RA, Barker MJ, Brigandt I.
When traditional essentialism fails:
biological natural kinds. Philos Top-
ics (2010) 35:189–215. doi:10.5840/
philtopics2007351/29
13. Barrett LF. Are emotions natural
kinds? Perspect Psychol Sci (2006)
1:28–58. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.
2006.00003.x
14. Griffiths PE. What Emotions Really
Are: The Problem of Psychological
Categories. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press (1997).
15. Brigandt I, Griffiths PE. The
importance of homology for biol-
ogy and philosophy. Biol Phi-
los (2007) 22:633–41. doi:10.1007/
s10539-007-9094-6
16. Matthen M. Defining vision: what
homology thinking contributes.
Biol Philos (2007) 22:675–89. doi:
10.1007/s10539-007-9088-4
17. Foddy B, Savulescu J. Addiction
and autonomy: can addicted peo-
ple consent to the prescription of
their drug of addiction? Bioethics
(2006) 20:1–15. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8519.2006.00470.x
18. Bechtel W, Richardson RC. Neu-
roimaging as a tool for functionally
decomposing cognitive processes.
In: Hanson SJ, Bunzl M, editors.
Foundational Issues in Human Brain
Mapping. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press (2010). p. 241–62.
19. Sinnott-Armstrong W, Pickard HA.
What is addiction? In: Fulford
KWM, Davies M, Gipps R, Graham
G, Sadler J, Stanghellini G, editors.
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Psychiatry. (Chap. 50), New York:
Oxford University Press (2013). p.
851–64.
20. Shea N. Neural mechanisms of
decision-making and the personal
level. In: Fulford KWM, Davies
M, Gipps R, Graham G, Sadler
J, Stanghellini G, editors. Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Psychia-
try. (Chap. 62), New York: Oxford
University Press (2013). p. 1063–82.
21. Melis M, Spiga S, Diana M. The
dopamine hypothesis of drug
addiction: hypodopaminergic
state. Int Rev Neurobiol (2005)
63:101–54. doi:10.1016/S0074-
7742(05)63005-X
22. Robinson TE, Berridge KC. The
neural basis of drug craving: an
incentive-sensitization theory
of addiction. Addiction (1993)
95:S91–117. doi:10.1046/j.1360-
0443.95.8s2.19.x
23. Robinson TE, Berridge KC. The
incentive sensitization theory of
addiction: some current issues. Phi-
los Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
(2008) 363:3137–46. doi:10.1098/
rstb.2008.0093
24. Berridge KC. The debate
over dopamine’s role in
reward: the case for incen-
tive salience. Psychopharmacol-
ogy (Berl) (2007) 191:391–431.
doi:10.1007/s00213-006-0578-x
25. Volkow ND, Wang GJ, Tomasi D,
Baler RD. Unbalanced neuronal cir-
cuits in addiction. Curr Opin Neu-
robiol (2013) 23(4):639–48. doi:10.
1016/j.conb.2013.01.002
26. Everitt BJ, Belin D, Economidou D,
Pelloux Y, Dalley JW, Robbins TW.
Neural mechanisms underlying the
vulnerability to develop compul-
sive drug-seeking habits and addic-
tion. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B
Biol Sci (2008) 363:3125–35. doi:10.
1098/rstb.2008.0089
27. White NM, McDonald RJ. Mul-
tiple parallel memory systems in
the brain of the rat. Neurobiol
Learn Mem (2002) 77:125–84. doi:
10.1006/nlme.2001.4008
28. Porrino LJ, Daunais JB, Smith HR,
Nader MA. The expanding effects
of cocaine: studies in a nonhu-
man primate model of cocaine self-
administration. Neurosci Biobehav
Rev (2004) 27:813–20. doi:10.1016/
j.neubiorev.2003.11.013
29. Volkow ND, Wang GJ, Fowler JS,
Logan J, Hitzemann R, Ding YS, et
al. Decreases in dopamine recep-
tors but not in dopamine trans-
porters in alcoholics. Alcohol Clin
Exp Res (1996) 20:1594–8. doi:10.
1111/j.1530-0277.1996.tb05936.x
30. Wang GJ, Volkow ND, Fowler JS,
Logan J, Abumrad NN, Hitze-
mann RJ, et al. Dopamine D2
receptor availability in opiate-





31. Volkow ND, Chang L, Wang GJ,
Fowler JS, Ding YS, Sedler M, et
al. Low level of brain dopamine
D2 receptors in methampheta-
mine abusers: association with
metabolism in the orbitofrontal
cortex. Am J Psychiatry (2001)
158:2015–21. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.
158.12.2015
32. Fehr C, Yakushev I, Hohmann N,
Buchholz HG, Landvogt C, Deck-
ers H, et al. Association of low stri-
atal dopamine D2 receptor avail-
ability with nicotine dependence
similar to that seen with other
drugs of abuse. Am J Psychia-
try (2008) 165:507–14. doi:10.1176/
appi.ajp.2007.07020352
33. Sevy S, Smith GS, Ma Y, Dhawan
V, Chaly T, Kingsley PB, et
al. Cerebral glucose metabolism
and D2/D3 receptor availability in
young adults with cannabis depen-
dence measured with positron emis-
sion tomography.Psychopharmacol-
ogy (Berl) (2008) 197:549–56. doi:
10.1007/s00213-008-1075-1
34. Stokes PR, Egerton A, Watson B,
Reid A, Lappin J, Howes OD,
et al. History of cannabis use is
not associated with alterations in
striatal dopamine D2/D3 recep-
tor availability. J Psychopharma-
col (2012) 26:144–9. doi:10.1177/
0269881111414090
35. Leroy C, Karila L, Martinot JL,
Lukasiewicz M, Duchesnay E, Com-
tat C, et al. Striatal and extras-
triatal dopamine transporter in
cannabis and tobacco addiction: a
high-resolution PET study. Addict
Biol (2011) 17:981–90. doi:10.1111/
j.1369-1600.2011.00356.x
36. Di Chiara G, Imperato A. Drugs
abused by humans preferentially
increase synaptic dopamine con-
centrations in the mesolimbic sys-
tem of freely moving rats. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A (1988) 85:5274–8.
doi:10.1073/pnas.85.14.5274
37. Wrase J, Schlagenhauf F, Kienast T,
Wüstenberg T, Bermpohl F, Kahnt
T, et al. Dysfunction of reward pro-
cessing correlates with alcohol crav-
ing in detoxified alcoholics. Neu-
roimage (2007) 35:787–94. doi:10.
1016/j.neuroimage.2006.11.043

























































Pober Addiction is not a natural kind
38. Bjork JM, Smith AR, Hommer
DW. Striatal sensitivity to reward
deliveries and omissions in sub-
stance dependent patients. Neu-
roimage (2008) 42:1609–21. doi:10.
1016/j.neuroimage.2008.06.035
39. Bühler M, Vollstädt-Klein S,
Kobiella A, Budde H, Reed
LJ, Braus DF, et al. Nicotine
dependence is characterized by
disordered reward processing
in a network driving motiva-
tion. Biol Psychiatry (2010) 67:
745–52. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.
2009.10.029
40. Nestor L, Hester R, Garavan R.
Increased ventral striatal BOLD
activity during non-drug reward




41. Wolfing K, Flor H, Grusser SM.
Psychophysiological responses to
drug-associated stimuli in chronic
heavy cannabis use. Eur J Neurosci
(2008) 27:976–83. doi:10.1111/j.
1460-9568.2008.06051.x
42. Varvel SA, Martin BR, Lichtman
AH. Lack of behavioral sensiti-
zation after repeated exposure to
THC in mice and comparison to
methamphetamine. Psychopharma-
cology (Berl) (2007) 193:511–9. doi:
10.1007/s00213-007-0811-2
43. Ahmed SH, Cador M. Dissoci-
ation of psychomotor sensitiza-
tion from compulsive cocaine con-
sumption. Neuropsychopharmacol-
ogy (2006) 31:563–71. doi:10.1038/
sj.npp.1300834
44. Volkow ND, Fowler JS. Addic-
tion, a disease of compulsion
and drive: involvement of the
orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb Cor-
tex (2000) 10:318–25. doi:10.1093/
cercor/10.3.318
45. Ray R, Zald DH. Anatomical
insights into the interaction of
emotion and cognition in the
prefrontal cortex. Neurosci Biobehav
Rev (2012) 36:479–501. doi:10.
1016/j.neubiorev.2011.08.005
46. Robinson TE, Kolb B. Structural
plasticity associated with exposure
to drugs of abuse. Neuropharmacol-
ogy (2004) 47:33–46. doi:10.1016/j.
neuropharm.2004.06.025
47. Kolb B, Gorny G, Limebeer CL,
Parker LA. Chronic treatment with
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol alters
the structure of neurons in the
nucleus accumbens shell and medial
prefrontal cortex of rats. Synapse
(2006) 60:429–36. doi:10.1002/syn.
20313
48. Huang CC, Lin HJ, Hsu KS.
Repeated cocaine adminis-
tration promotes long-term
potentiation induction in rat
medial prefrontal cortex. Cereb
Cortex (2007) 17:1877–88.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhl096
49. Lu H, Cheng PL, Lim BK, Khosh-
nevisrad N, Poo MM. Elevated
BDNF after cocaine withdrawal
facilitates LTP in medial prefrontal
cortex by suppressing GABA inhi-
bition. Neuron (2010) 67:821–33.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.08.012
50. Van den Oever MC, Goriounova
NA, Li KW, Van der Schors RC,
Binnekade R, Schoffelmeer AN, et
al. Prefrontal cortex AMPA recep-
tor plasticity is crucial for cue-
induced relapse to heroin-seeking.
Nat Neurosci (2008) 11:1053–8. doi:
10.1038/nn.2165
51. Bossert JM, Stern AL, Theberge FR,
Cifani C, Koya E, Hope BT, et
al. Ventral medial prefrontal cor-
tex neuronal ensembles mediate
context-induced relapse to heroin.
Nat Neurosci (2011) 14:420–2. doi:
10.1038/nn.2758
52. Fuchs RA, Evans KA, Ledford
CC, Parker MP, Case JM, Mehta
RH, et al. The role of the dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex, baso-
lateral amygdala, and dorsal
hippocampus in contextual




53. Ahmed SH. Validation crisis in
animal models of drug addiction:
beyond non-disordered drug use
toward drug addiction. Neurosci
Biobehav Rev (2010) 35:172–84.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.04.
005
54. Ahmed SH. The science of
making drug-addicted ani-
mals. Neuroscience (2012) 211:
107–25. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.
2011.08.014
55. Samuels R. Delusion as a natural
kind. In: Broome M, Bortolotti
L, editors. Psychiatry as Cogni-
tive Neuroscience: Philosophical Per-
spectives. (Chap. 3), New York:
Oxford University Press (2009).
p. 49–79.
56. Scarantino A. How to
define emotions scientifically.
Emot Rev (2012) 4:358–68.
doi:10.1177/1754073912445810
57. Holton R.Willing,Wanting,Waiting.
New York: Oxford University Press
(2009).
58. Vandrey R, Haney M. How real is
the risk of addiction? In: Holland
J, editor. The Pot Book: A Com-
plete Guide to Cannabis: Its Role in
Medicine, Politics, Science, and Cul-
ture. Rochester,VT: Park Street Press
(2010). p. 187–95.
59. Hacking I. A tradition of nat-
ural kinds. Philos Stud (1991) 61:
109–26. doi:10.1007/BF00385836
60. Dupre J. Natural kinds and biologi-
cal taxa.Philos Rev (1981) 90:66–90.
doi:10.2307/2184373
61. Pickard HA. The purpose in
chronic addiction. AJOB Neu-
rosci (2012) 3:40–9. doi:10.1080/
21507740.2012.663058
62. Pober JM. Is addiction a
heterogeneous condition?
Reflections on Pickard’s “the
purpose in chronic addiction.”
AJOB Neurosci (2012) 3:52–4.
doi:10.1080/21507740.2012.666327
63. Belin D, Mar AC, Dalley JW, Rob-
bins TW, Everitt BJ. High impul-
sivity predicts the switch to com-
pulsive cocaine seeking. Science
(2008) 320:1352–5. doi:10.1126/
science.1158136
64. Koob GF, Le Moal M. Drug
addiction, dysregulation of reward,
and allostasis. Neuropscyhopharma-
cology (2001) 24:318–25.
65. Godfrey-Smith P. Theory and Real-
ity. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press (2003).
66. Griffiths MD. Is loss of control
always a consequence of addiction?
Front Psychiatry (2013) 4:36. doi:10.
3389/fpsyt.2013.00036
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 14 June 2013; accepted: 18 Sep-
tember 2013; published online: 04 Octo-
ber 2013.
Citation: Pober JM (2013) Addiction is
not a natural kind. Front. Psychiatry
4:123. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00123
This article was submitted to Addictive
Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol, a
section of the journal Frontiers in Psychi-
atry.
Copyright © 2013 Pober. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 123 | 11
